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Jonassen: Cell-Site Simulators

STINGRAYS, TRIGGERFISH, AND HAILSTORMS, OH MY!
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE
INCREASING GOVERNMENT USE OF CELL-SITE
SIMULATORS
Jenna Jonassen *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since as early as its interpretation in Katz v. United States, 1 the
Fourth Amendment has protected the privacy rights of individuals in
situations where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. 2 This
finding was based on a narrow reading of the Fourth Amendment’s
own language, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. 3
However, emerging technology has undoubtedly called into
question what was assumed to be an almost indelible protection of an
*Touro

College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; Siena College, B.A., in
English, minor in Writing and Communications, 2009. I would like to give a special thanks
to my advisor, the Honorable Mark Cohen, for his inspiration, insight, and overwhelming
confidence in my abilities throughout this process. I also owe gratitude to my parents, brother,
and sister for their never-ending patience and encouragement while I work to achieve all of
my law school aspirations. Thank you to all of my friends for their support in this endeavor,
especially my lifelong friend, Kristin Sheridan, who provides nothing but endless love and
laughs. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my note editor, Jessica Vogele, for
her guidance every step of the way—I could not have had a better role model.
1 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Christopher D. Browne, Ill-Suited to the Digital Age: Problems with Emerging Judicial
Perspectives on Warrantless Searches of Cell Site Location Information, 4 NW.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L. REV. 57, 83-84 (2013).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
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individual’s privacy interests. In 2001, the United States Supreme
Court recognized in Kyllo v. United States 4 that “[i]t would be foolish
to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.” 5 Yet, since Kyllo was decided, the amount of available
technology has only grown, with the technology information business
expected to become a $547 billion industry in 2017. 6 Consistent with
the findings of the Supreme Court in Kyllo, 7 and particularly the late
Justice Anton Scalia, 8 it is clear that this quickly-advancing technology
has made it increasingly difficult for the Court to keep up with its
potential constitutional implications. Now with the emergence of
advanced surveillance equipment, it has become judicially and
statutorily unclear as to what degree this technology either eliminates
or reduces such expectations of privacy, especially with respect to
cellular telephone devices. 9
Today, cellular and mobile devices have become the primary
platform for communication, 10 financial transactions, 11 political
4

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
Id. at 34.
6 2017 Technology, Media, and Telecommunications Predictions Infographics, DELOITTE
GLOBAL, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/TechnologyMedia-Telecommunications/gx-deloitte-2017-tmt-predictions-infographics.pdf (last visited
Mar. 18, 2017).
7 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
8 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]he Katz test
rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and
stable set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the
tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as
inevitable.”).
9 This is based on the unanswered question as to whether an individual whose use of a
device which knowingly transmits information through third-party wireless carriers actually
has a reasonable expectation that the transmissions will remain private.
10 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/factsand-infographics/archive/infographic-smartphones-comprise-77-percent-of-traffic-onwireless-networks (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that 56.6% of device connections in
North America come from smartphones); Aaron Smith, U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/01/us-smartphoneuse-in-2015/ (indicating that 67% of smartphone users use their phones to share pictures,
videos, or commentary about community events).
11 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-andinfographics-details/fact-and-infographics/98-percent-of-visit-growth-in-e-commerce-fromsmartphones (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that “[s]martphones account for 98% of
5
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information, 12 content streaming, 13 and location services. 14 Since
cellular technology has become a ubiquitous force in the function of
today’s society, it is of no surprise that local police and federal
agencies have also attempted to take advantage of society’s reliance on
these devices by using them as an investigatory assistance tool to help
establish the location of victims, fugitives, criminals, and terrorists. 15
With the development of military-type technology, federal and state
police agencies have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on cellsite simulator equipment that can be used to manipulate radiofrequency transmissions from cellular phone towers to give police an
identified target’s cellular location. 16 The most technologicallyadvanced versions of these simulators, devices known primarily as a
StingRays, Triggerfish, or Hailstorms, have been used by numerous
local and federal government agencies to obtain information from all

the growth in digital commerce site visits worldwide”); Facts and Infographic Archives,
CTIA,
http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-and-infographics-details/fact-andinfographics/more-than-one-quarter-of-millennials-prefer-shopping-via-smartphone
(last
visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that 28% of millennials in the United States alone “prefer
shopping on their smartphones than on their computers”); Smith, supra note 10 (indicating
that 57% of wireless users use their phones for wireless banking).
12 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/factsand-infographics/archive/infographic-voters-increasingly-use-smartphones-for-political-info
(last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that in 2014, approximately 28% of voters used their
cellular smart devices for political information, more than double the amount in 2010); Smith,
supra note 10 (indicating that 40% of cellular uses use their devices to look up government
services or information).
13 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-andinfographics-details/fact-and-infographics/young-adults-spend-more-than-11-hours-perweek-streaming-via-smartphones (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that those between
the ages of 18-24 spend more than 11 hours per week streaming content from their mobile
phones); Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/resource-library/factsand-infographics/archive/infographic-more-than-half-of-digital-video-views-will-be-onmobile-next-year (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that over 52% of all digital worldwide
video views in 2016 will be from mobile devices).
14 See Facts and Infographics Archive, CTIA, http://www.ctia.org/industry-data/facts-andinfographics-details/fact-and-infographics/73-percent-of-millennials-use-smartphone-whenlost (last visited Mar. 18, 2017) (indicating that 73% of millennials first turn to their cellular
telephones when getting lost as opposed to utilizing other means); Smith, supra note 10
(indicating that 67% of smartphone users use their phone for “turn-by-turn navigation while
driving,” with 25% using their phone to obtain public transit information, and 11% using their
phones “at least occasionally to reserve a car or taxi service.”).
15 See, e.g., In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location
Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
16 In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of StingRays, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION, https://www.nyclu.org/en/legislation/support-warrant-requirement-use-stingrays (last
visited Mar. 18, 2017).
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surrounding cellular devices in order to locate their targets. 17 Once the
target is discovered, the police are able to surveil with real-time
tracking, leading them to the target’s almost precise location without
wasting valuable police time and resources. 18
However, many have recognized that the ability of state and
local governments to freely use such technology to their advantage
does not come without potential Fourth Amendment implications.19 In
fact, few statutory and common law principles currently stand in the
way of the government’s ability to use and therefore potentially abuse
these devices. 20 Similarly, minimal, if any, court approval is needed
to authorize their use. 21
Though initial use of this technology had previously evaded
court intervention for quite some time, 22 jurisdictions are currently
split as to how the benefits of this technology can still be used without
violation of an individual’s privacy rights. 23 Some authorities have
required that agencies establish the minimal criteria needed for a penregister/trap-trace warrant 24 before cell-site location data can be
obtained through the use of a cell-site simulator. 25 Contrarily, some
courts have placed a much heavier burden on the proponent, requiring
that they establish sufficient probable cause 26 prior to its legal use.27
17

See id.
Id.
19 See, e.g., Brian L. Owsley, TriggerFish, StingRays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing
Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L. J. 183 (2014); Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, Your
Secret StingRay’s No Secret Anymore: The Vanishing Government Monopoly over Cell Phone
Surveillance and Its Impact on National Security and Consumer Privacy, 28 HARV. L. J. OF
TECH. 1 (2014).
20 Browne, supra note 2, at 57.
21 Stephanie K. Pell & Christopher Soghoian, A Lot More Than a Pen Register, and Less
Than a Wiretap: What the StingRay Teaches Us About How Congress Should Approach the
Reform of Law Enforcement Surveillance Authorities, 16 YALE L.J. & TECH. 134, 142 (2013).
22 Browne, supra note 2, at 57.
23 Christopher Izant, Note, Stingray Surveillance: Legal Rules by Statute or Subsumption?,
15,
2016
at
10:32
PM),
HARV. L. SCH. NAT’L SEC. J. (July
http://harvardnsj.org/2016/07/stingray-surveillance-legal-rules-by-statute-or-subsumption/.
24 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012) (indicating what the contents of an application for a
pen/register warrant must include).
25 Izant, supra note 23.
26 As a primarily judicial construct, “probable cause” has no statutory definition; however,
the United States Supreme Court has indicated that it requires belief that the condition
precedent to the execution of a search warrant will occur and that, once it has, “there is a fair
probability that the contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a specified place.” U.S.
v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
27 Izant, supra note 23.
18
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However, without any governing standard upon which to rely, the
potential ongoing violation of individual privacy rights remains high
with the continuing use of this technology.
Accordingly, this Note attempts to provide an accurate road
map of the various types of information concerning cell-site simulator
use and how its implications on Fourth Amendment rights call for the
establishment of a sufficient probable cause warrant prior to its use.
Section II will outline the basic technology behind the functionality of
cellular telephones. This information is vital to the understanding of
the concepts discussed in Section III, the basic functionality of cellsite simulator devices, more commonly known as StingRays,
Triggerfish, or Hailstorms. Section III will also delve into the
developments, costs, and frequency of use of such devices on a
national spectrum.
Section IV will discuss the changes in the interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution over time and how this “right
to be left alone” has transformed with the progressions in new
technology. Relatedly, Section V will address Congress’s past and
present attempts at providing guidance for the advancements in
electronic surveillance equipment. As examined therein, it was not
until a few years ago that the legality of cell-site simulators was even
discussed, despite reports indicating their use by government agencies
for several years prior. 28 While Section V will discuss the
inadequacies of the law in regulating cell-site simulators, Section VI
will document the strongest argument against the need for even
minimal regulation of these devices—the third-party disclosure
doctrine. This doctrine relies upon an individual’s voluntary
relinquishment of his privacy rights to third parties, which proponents
argue occurs upon the signing of a cellular contract. 29 Section VII will
analyze how the lower courts have interpreted the impact of the use of
cell-site simulators on Fourth Amendment rights and therefore will
provide a brief discussion of the current common law on this subject.
Finally, Section VIII will provide an overall analysis on this
subject and how a Supreme Court decision on the quantum of proof
necessary for the authorization of use of a cell-site simulator is
desperately needed to provide the lower courts with reliable precedent.
Nonetheless, because most cases and agency procedure guidelines

28
29

Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 143.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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discussed herein seem to reflect the conclusion that cell-site simulators
have a strong tendency to implicate an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights, often inadvertently by the very nature of their functionality, it
seems likely that the Supreme Court would resolve the jurisdictional
splits by requiring that any potential user establish probable cause to
justify such an intrusive invasion into an individual’s private life.
II.

BASIC CELLULAR PHONE FUNCTIONALITY

At the most basic level, a cellular phone is best described as a
“short-range radio transmitter” 30 that has the capability of making and
receiving calls through the transmission of radio frequencies to
“cellular base stations” or “cell sites” 31 on cellular network towers 32
(“cell towers”) generally located within three to 15 miles 33 from the
cellular device. Upon receipt of these transmissions, the cell tower
then transmits or “pings” this signal to other cell towers within the
service provider’s network until it becomes in range of the recipient of
the call. 34 Therefore, in order for the radio frequency to transmit to the
intended recipient, it must weave a path between the caller and the
recipient by bouncing back and forth between the network’s cell
towers. 35 To ensure the strongest signal between the caller and the
intended recipient, cell phones are able to locate the closest cell towers

30

Browne, supra note 2, at 61.
Owsley, supra note 19, at 187-88 (indicating that cell sites are usually placed “atop
towers, but the equipment can also be placed on trees, roofs, flagpoles, and buildings.”).
32 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a
Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (indicating that
individual cellular towers within a network can be anywhere from miles apart (more common
in less populated rural areas) to several hundred feet apart (more common in more highly
populated areas)).
33 Browne, supra note 2, at 61-62.
34 Browne, supra note 2, at 62.
35 The path which cell phone signals take is best exemplified by the following:
When a caller dials a number on a cellular telephone, a transceiver sends
signals over the air on a radiofrequency to a cell site. From there the signal
travels over phone lines or a microwave to a computerized mobile
telephone switching office (“MTSO”) or station.
The MTSO
automatically and inaudibly switches the conversation from one base
station and one frequency to another as the portable telephone moves from
cell to cell.
Owsley, supra note 19, at 188.
31
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by sending automatic signals in a procedure known as “registration.”36
This process finds the strongest signal by forcing the cellular phone to
“identif[y] the closest tower, and ensure[] that calls sent to and
received by the phone will be routed through that tower . . . .” 37
This registration process occurs repeatedly every seven
seconds as long as the cellular device is turned on 38 and cannot be
controlled at the discretion of the cellular user. 39 It also permits the
cellular device to be identified through a series of identification
numbers 40 and allows the service providers “to create and maintain a
record of every cell tower with which each phone on their networks
has registered, and when each of those registrations happened.” 41 This
collected data stored by the cellular service provider is more
commonly known as cell-site location information (“CLSI”). 42
Through the collection of CLSI, the cellular service provider has the
means to identify the location of a cellular user at any given time
through monitoring of the registration process. 43 While cellular
36

Owsley, supra note 19, at 188; Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 144. The United States
Department of Justice, via an Electronic Surveillance Manual, describes the registration
procedure as follows:
Cellular telephones that are powered on will automatically register or reregister with a cellular tower as the phone travels within the provider’s
service area. The registration process is the technical means by which the
network identifies the subscriber, validates the account and determines
where to route call traffic. This exchange occurs on a dedicated control
channel that is clearly separate from that used for call content (i.e. audio)
— which occurs on a separate dedicated channel.
Electronic Surveillance Manual: Procedures and Case Law Forms, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 17879 n.41 (rev. June 2005), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docs/elec-sur-manual.pdf.
37 Browne, supra note 2, at 62.
38 Browne, supra note 2, at 62.
39 Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 36, at 40.
40 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap and
Trace Device and Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F. Supp.
2d 747, 750 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“[T]hese codes include an Electronic Serial Number (a unique
32-bit number programmed into the phone by the manufacturer), and a Mobile Identification
Number, a 10-digit number derived from the phone’s number.”).
41 Browne, supra note 2, at 62-63. The Department of Justice’s Electronic Service Manual
indicates that the collection of this data is necessary to “provide service to cellular telephones.”
Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 36, at 42.
42 Browne, supra note 2, at 63.
43 Browne, supra note 2, at 63 (indicating that the registration process allows a network
carrier “to pinpoint the location of a cell phone by cross-referencing the location of the cell
tower with which the phone registered, at the time at which the registration occurred. Using
this information, a cell phone service provider can determine the location of a cell phone, and
by implication its user, at virtually any point in time . . . .”). See also In re Application of the
U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Telephone,
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carriers claim that the collection of such data is primarily used by
network service providers for billing purposes, 44 use of this
information leaves the carrier able to identify a cellular device within
an isolated range of the nearest cell tower, 45 the accuracy of which
increases with the growing use of smart phone technology and the
installation of more cell towers by service providers. 46
III.

CELL-SITE SIMULATORS:
DEVELOPMENTS, COSTS, AND USAGE

Cell-site simulators, otherwise known as International Mobile
Subscriber Identity (“IMSI”) catchers, are the government’s most
widely used “spy” tools to track cellular phone activity. 47 The concept
was first invented by a German manufacturing company known as
Rohde & Schwarz in 1996 when it created a machine that forced
cellular devices within range to identify their own serial numbers for
surveillance purposes. 48 However, the technology behind this concept
quickly advanced as the United States government, military agencies,
and intelligence agencies helped in making these devices more
refined. 49 In just a few years, the Harris Corporation, a Florida-based

460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Knowledge of the locations of multiple towers
receiving signals from a particular telephone at a given moment permits the determination, by
simple mathematics, of the location of the telephone with a fair degree of precision through
the long established process known as triangulation.”); Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 1213 (indicating that the service provider is not only able to pinpoint the phone’s location, but
also numbers recently called and other personal data).
44 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a
Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 451 (indicating that this information is
generally used to determine whether roaming charges apply or to track call volume to
determine the need for more cell towers).
45 Id. at 450-51 (stating that in some cases the closest tower receiving the signal from a
cellular device can pinpoint not only the range of the device from the tower, but also “in which
of the three 120-degree arcs of the 360-degree circle surrounding the tower the particular
phone is located.”); Browne, supra note 2, at 64 (indicating that this degree of accuracy can
be up to a 200-foot range, which is enough to determine a cell phone user’s location in “a
building or other residence”).
46 Browne, supra note 2, at 64.
47 See generally Electronic Surveillance Manual, supra note 36; Pell & Soghoian, supra
note 21.
48 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 13-14 (citing Dirk Fox, IMSI-Catcher, 21
DATENSCHUTZ UND DATENSICHERHEIT 539, 539 (1997)).
49 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 14.
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manufacturer, 50 exclusively developed, and continues to develop, 51
more sophisticated cell-simulator devices, including Triggerfish, and
the most commonly-known and technologically advanced version, the
StingRay machine. 52
Still, little is known about the specifics behind the development
of these highly technical machines outside of what is minimally
provided by patent and trademark registration information 53 and
Freedom of Information Law (“FOIL”) requests made by advocates
against the use of cell-site devices to numerous police departments and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”). 54 For example, purchase
orders released in response to these FOIL requests fail to indicate
anything more than the fact that these machines were purchased from
the Harris Corporation at relatively high prices. 55 However, what is
50 According to the Harris Corporation’s website, it specializes in the manufacture of
“tactical communications, geospatial systems and services, air traffic management,
environmental solutions, avionics and electronic warfare, and space and intelligence.” About
Harris, HARRIS TECHNOLOGY, https://www.harris.com/about (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
51 Ryan Gallagher, Law & Disorder: Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/meet-themachines-that-steal-your-phones-data/.
52 See W. Scott Kim, Note, The Fourth Amendment Implications on the Real-Time Tracking
of Cell Phones Through the Use of “Stingrays,” 26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT.
L. J. 995, 1001 (2016) (indicating that the Patent and Trademark Office reveals that the name
StingRay was registered as a trademark in 2003 by the Harris Corporation); Pell & Soghoian,
supra note 19, at 14-15; Gallagher, supra note 51 (indicating that trademark information for
the first StingRay machine was filed by Harris Corporation in August 2001); Stingrays, N.Y.
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/stingrays (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
53 Gallagher, supra note 51. In fact, the Harris Corporation website itself does not indicate
to the public that it manufactures such equipment. Kim, supra note 52, at 1000.
54 See Stingrays, supra note 52 (discussing FOIL requests made to the Erie County Sheriff’s
Office, Rochester Sheriff’s Department, and the New York State Police in 2015).
55 The New York Civil Liberties Union website indicates that in May 2014, the New York
State Police released purchase orders which revealed that they had paid $197,100 to obtain a
StingRay device in 2005, as well as a total of $263,230 to maintain and upgrade equipment
and provide training for StingRay machines in 2012, which increased in 2013 by $181,174.
This revealed that the New York State Police had spent at least $651,504 on this StingRay
machine. Also, in May 2016, the Rochester Police Department produced information that they
purchased a StingRay machine known as “KingFish” from the Harris Corporation in June of
2015. The information further provides that KingFish is able to be attached to department
vehicles to identify and track cellular devices and costs the Rochester New York Police
Department approximately $200,600 for hardware, software, and training on use of the device.
The website also suggests that such hardware would likely cost the Rochester Police
Department additional thousands of dollars to be used for yearly maintenance fees with the
Harris Corporation in order to keep the cell-site simulator operational. In particular, one record
revealed that the Harris Corporation informed the Rochester Police Department that it had to
upgrade its KingFish unit to the Hailstorm unit to keep its technology operational for a cost of
$388,000. See Stingrays, supra note 52.
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known is that the Harris Corporation has earned approximately $40
million from technology contracts with local city and state police
authorities in providing cell-site simulator equipment. 56 Based on the
availability of procurement records, federal authorities alone have
been noted to spend over $30 million on cell-site simulator equipment
since 2004. 57 However, most authorities show that the funding for
such machines comes from the federal government through anti-terror
grants. 58
StingRay machines have been described as “box-shaped
portable device[s],” which function by impersonating cellular base
stations 59 and deceiving any nearby cellular devices into thinking that
they are connecting to a cellular tower. 60 The portability of the device
is important to its function, as it can be set up anywhere, even in
moving vehicles. 61 Accordingly, these devices can be easily moved to
more accurately pinpoint the location of a cellular device user in real
time. 62
Though police agencies admit that use of these devices is an
essential investigatory tool that provides “important crime-fighting
and surveillance techniques” 63 that can “help solve crimes, track
fugitives or abducted children or even foil a terror attack,” 64 the
information obtained from a StingRay is not narrowly limited to the
subject of the agency’s search. 65 Contrarily, StingRay devices are
known to force all cell phones in the area of the cell tower to send their
56

Gallagher, supra note 51.
Gallagher, supra note 51.
58 John Kelly, Cellphone Data Spying: It’s Not Just the NSA, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/08/cellphone-data-spying-nsapolice/3902809/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
59 Gallagher, supra note 51.
60 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 11; Gallagher, supra note 51.
61 Gallagher, supra note 51.
62 Ryan Gallagher, FBI Accused of Dragging Feet on Release of Info About “Stingray”
Surveillance Technology, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (Oct. 19, 2012, 4:00 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2012/10/19/stingray_imsi_fbi_accused_by_epic_of
_dragging_feet_on_releasing_documents.html.
63 Kelly, supra note 58.
64 Kelly, supra note 58.
65 Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Daniel Rigmaiden’s Motion to Suppress at
1, 3, United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800 (No. 904-3),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/rigmaiden_amicus.pdf (referring to such a search as a
“dragnet sweep” and indicating that in “locat[ing] a suspect’s cell phone, [S]ting[R]ays obtain
information from all devices on the same network in a given area and send signals into the
homes, bags, or pockets of the suspect and third parties alike.”). Kim, supra note 52, at 997.
57
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identification information to the device. 66 Since the machine is only
able to detect a particular cellular phone’s identification once it
registers with a network, the device must search and collect
information from every in-range cellular device before it can actually
pinpoint the targeted user. 67 Some upgrades to the StingRay machines
make their functionality even more intrusive—software upgrade
“FishHawk” allows users to listen to conversations without the cellular
user’s knowledge, while the “Porpoise” upgrade can be installed to
provide dual-functionality for surveillance of both location and
incoming and outgoing text messages. 68
As reported by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”),
at least 68 agencies in 23 different states have admitted to owning at
least one cell-site simulator. 69 The New York Police Department, the
biggest municipal police department in the nation, is claimed to have
used cell-phone tracking devices at least 1,000 times since 2008, or as
frequently as 200 times per year, all the while avoiding any judicial
guidance as to the constitutionality of its use due to the lack of
requirements. 70 In Erie County, New York, reports reveal that the
Sheriff’s Office had utilized cell-site simulator technology
approximately 47 times during investigations over the last four years,
while only once obtaining a minimum degree of judicial approval
before using the equipment. 71 On a federal level, agencies known to
use cell-site simulation technology include the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”); the Drug Enforcement Administration
(“DEA”); the United States Secret Service; the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; the United States Marshals Service; the Bureau
66

Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 8, 10.
Izant, supra note 23.
68 Gallagher, supra note 51.
69 Such states are noted to include Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Other states continue to conceal whether they use cellsite simulator technology for investigative purposes and whether there is any judicial approval
prior to their use of the machines. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, AM. CIV.
LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-them (last
visited Mar. 18, 2017).
70 Joseph Goldstein, New York Police Are Using Covert Cellphone Trackers, Civil Liberties
Group Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/12/nyregion/newyork-police-dept-cellphone-tracking-stingrays.html.
71 NYPD Has Used Stingrays More Than 1,000 Times Since 2008, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES
UNION (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nypd-has-used-stingrays-more-1000times-2008.
67
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of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Internal Revenue
Service; the United States Army; the United States Navy; the United
States Marine Corps; the United States National Guard; the United
States Special Operations Command; and the National Security
Agency. 72
IV.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE
A. Early Interpretations of the Fourth Amendment

While the Fourth Amendment explicitly states that “[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,” 73
this seemingly simple and unequivocal statement of rights has
triggered “[o]ver a century of jurisprudential uncertainty.” 74 Though
the scope and application of the Fourth Amendment has changed
considerably over time, with this uncertainty being such a significant
part of the history of the Fourth Amendment, it is no surprise that the
modern advancements in technology continue to frustrate the
application of the Fourth Amendment. 75
Initially, the Supreme Court had interpreted the context of the
Fourth Amendment to be a mere extension of an individual’s property
rights, based on the concept that, sans technology, both physical
trespass and intrusion had to occur for a government agent to actually
conduct a search. 76 As a result, the Supreme Court held that Fourth
Amendment rights were only implicated during actual physical
intrusion of an individual’s private property. 77 However, the Supreme
Court shifted its application after deciding United States v. Katz, in

72

Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 70.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
74 Will Stancil, Note, Warrantless Search Cases Are Really All the Same, 97 MINN. L. R.
337, 339 (2012).
75 Id. (“Over a century of jurisprudential uncertainty has stemmed from warring
interpretations of those twenty-four words.”).
76 Id. at 340-41.
77 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (as the seminal case to initially
determine that Fourth Amendment protection stemmed from property interests). Further,
compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942) (holding that a monitoring
device placed against the wall of a private residence was not unlawful) with Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961) (holding that police surveillance violated Fourth
Amendment rights of the defendant when evidence was obtained upon use of a device that was
physically driven into the wall).
73
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which it found that the Fourth Amendment did not protect property or
places but instead protected people. 78 Therefore, any person who had
a “justifiable, reasonable, or legitimate” expectation of privacy which
was annexed by government action would have standing to claim a
Fourth Amendment violation. 79 Under Katz, physical trespass of
property was no longer the only means under which one could claim a
Fourth Amendment violation, 80 forcing the Court to subsequently
define the circumstances that would prompt a “reasonable expectation
of privacy” in order to comply with the Katz test. While cases were
determined on a fact-specific basis, it was generally held that
reasonable expectations of privacy did not exist in situations where
someone had voluntarily made otherwise private details available for
public knowledge, 81 or in areas where little, if any, intimate activities
took place. 82
However, while this is easily applied to the
aforementioned situations, the courts struggled with the introduction
of modern technology and how it complied with the Katz test.
B.

The Fourth Amendment as Applied to New
Technology

Of all of the Court’s cases which confronted the use of new
technology, Kyllo v. United States 83 is certainly one of the most
influential, since its holding broadly applied Fourth Amendment
protections to emerging surveillance equipment. 84 Evaluating whether
or not the use of a thermal imaging device to read heatwaves from the
interior of defendant’s home constituted an unreasonable search in

78

United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Id. at 352 (indicating that a person who enters a telephone booth, though within public
view, is still a person protected by the Fourth Amendment so long as he has an objective
reasonable belief and assumption “that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world.”).
80 Id. at 352-53.
81 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that an individual had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in performing illegal activities in an area that was commonly
and easily visible from the air); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (holding that a
police search of garbage left on the street was not in violation of an individual’s Fourth
Amendment rights).
82 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that an open field was not
intended to be protected from government intrusion under the Fourth Amendment because it
does “not provide the setting for . . . intimate activities . . .”).
83 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
84 Id.
79
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violation of the Fourth Amendment, 85 the Court held that an individual
has an indelible, and therefore reasonable, expectation of privacy
within the four walls of the home, and the information that was
obtained by the use of the thermal imaging device, though not obtained
by physical means, still constituted an unreasonable intrusion because
the information could not have been obtained otherwise. 86 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, indicated that the Fourth Amendment
was not constricted by technological advancements, especially when
these advancements intruded into the most protected area of private
property— the four walls of the home. 87 However, Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy, wrote in the dissent
that the only actual intrusion into the home was heat, and given that
heat could be just as easily sensed by any member of the public from
outside the home as it could from a thermal imaging device, an
individual would have no reasonable expectation of privacy against
it. 88 Had the Court utilized the overly simplistic rationale of the
dissent, arguably any use of modern surveillance technology would
pose no reasonable threat against an individual’s perception of privacy
because anyone from the general public could technically observe
one’s location.
The Court subsequently addressed a technological
advancement similar to cell-site simulators in United States v. Knotts.89
In Knotts, the Court set out to determine whether the use of location
technology constrained the protections provided by the Fourth
Amendment. 90 The Court held that police reliance on a beeper’s signal
to track the final destination of defendant’s vehicle did not violate the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, 91 relying on the concept
that an individual “traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one

85

Id. at 29.
Id. at 35-39, 40.
87 Id. at 33-34.
88 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 42-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Any member of the public might
notice that one part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby building if, for example,
rainwater evaporates or snow melts at different rates across its surfaces. Such use of the senses
would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead, an adjoining neighbor allowed an
officer onto her property to verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer.”).
89 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
90 Id. at 277.
91 Id. at 284-85.
86
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place to another.” 92 The Court reasoned that such information was not
private and could have easily been gathered by simple observation.93
Due to the obvious lack of intrusion involved in obtaining information
made public versus that obtained from the interior of a home, the most
private and protected of locations, it is clear why the Court ruled
differently in Knotts than it did in Kyllo.
Contrarily, in deciding United States v. Karo, 94 the Court held
that location surveillance equipment placed into a can of chemicals to
monitor the movement of the container in connection with potential
drug trafficking did pose a Fourth Amendment violation. 95 In this
case, the DEA learned that the defendant had ordered 50 gallons of
ether from a government informant to extract cocaine from clothing
that had been trafficked into the United States. 96 In response, the DEA
planted a location-tracking device in one of the cans of ether that it
delivered to the defendant. 97 Using the tracking device to follow the
location of the ether, the DEA traced the signal to many locations, one
of which was the defendant’s own residence. 98 In contrast to the facts
of Knotts, the government’s device in Karo was able to track the
defendant’s movements inside the walls of his own home which could
not have been obtained through simple visual observance. 99 As a
result, the Court ruled that this was an unreasonable intrusion. 100
With the development of more precise location technology, the
Supreme Court was once again forced to address technology’s impact
on Fourth Amendment rights in United States v. Jones. 101 Here, the
Court addressed the government’s placement of a global-positioning
(“GPS”) tracking device to the undercarriage of the defendant’s
vehicle. 102 Using this device, the government was able to monitor the
defendant’s whereabouts for a total of 28 days on suspicion of drug

92

Id. at 276.
Id.
94 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
95 Id. at 706.
96 Id. at 708.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 709.
99 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715 (contrasting this case with United States v. Knotts in that the
information obtained here was not something that could have been “visually verified”).
100 Id. at 718.
101 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
102 Id. at 402.
93
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trafficking. 103 In holding that this GPS tracking constituted an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, 104 the Court
asserted that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test did not
substitute the Fourth Amendment rights for common law trespass, but
merely added to them. 105 More simply put, although the Court had
previously indicated that physical intrusion and trespass of property
were required for a search to have actually occurred, 106 the decision in
Jones broadened the list of activities which constituted a search within
the context of the Fourth Amendment. 107 In light of this, the
concurrence found that the defendant did have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his public whereabouts when under longterm monitoring by the government. 108
Specifically, Justice
Sotomayor conceded that the concept of location tracking in general
threatened an individual’s reasonable expectations of privacy:
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive
record of a person’s public movements that reflects a
wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations . . . .
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills
associational and expressive freedoms. And the
Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that
reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.
The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making
available at a relatively low cost such a substantial
quantum of intimate information about any person
whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion,
chooses to track—may alter the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that it is inimical to
democratic society.

103

Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 404, 413.
105 Id. at 409.
106 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
107 Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (holding that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle with
the purpose of monitoring the whereabouts of the vehicle constituted a search under the Fourth
Amendment).
108 Id. at 413-14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
104
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I would take these attributes of GPS monitoring into
account when considering the existence of a reasonable
societal expectation of privacy in the sum of one’s
public movements. I would ask whether people
reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their
political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so
on. 109
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence, especially when considered
in conjunction with the majority opinion, suggested that modern
technological advancements do not limit an individual’s rights
pertaining to unreasonable search and seizures as provided under the
Fourth Amendment.
It has been argued that the placement of advanced technology
in the hands of the public can leave those individuals with no true
expectation of privacy, as people who are aware of the capabilities of
technology should have no expectation to be safe from it. 110
Nonetheless, the Court has consistently held steadfast to the belief that
Fourth Amendment rights are fixed and not amorphous. 111 While the
Court has placed great emphasis on the expectation of privacy found
within the four walls of the home, an overall analysis of the
aforementioned Supreme Court cases reveal that one has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in any act that is not knowingly made public or
ordinarily observed.
V.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AS APPLIED TO CELL-SITE
SIMULATION DEVICES

With little case law discussing the limitations of law
enforcement in utilizing cell-site simulation devices, there is a
109

Id. at 415-16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 580 (2009).
111 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 404, 413 (affirming the decision of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and holding that an individual’s privacy rights
were not minimized by the government’s warrantless placement of GPS technology on the
individual’s vehicle); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the
government’s use of a thermal imaging device to expose intimate and private details about the
petitioner was unconstitutional); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that
the government’s use of an electronic recording device positioned outside of a telephone booth
in order to listen to the petitioner’s words violated his reasonable expectation of privacy).
110
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concomitant lack of agency guidance concerning use of this
technology, especially when compared with other devices used by the
government. 112 What little is known about the regulation of cell-site
simulators is comprised in a few acts and magistrate opinions which
fail to account for both the frequency and recommended use of cellsite simulators. 113 Only when carefully pieced together can such scarce
guidelines actually assist in determining the restraints that the
government must take in using such intrusive technology. Although
they are few and far between, there are some acts, common law, and
Department of Justice guidelines that have impacted the law
concerning the collection of cell-site information. 114 Below is a brief
history of some of the most relevant acts and orders that have shaped
the law surrounding the collection of cell-site data as known today.
A.

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1968 and Pen/Trap Orders

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1968
(“ECPA”) was, and still is, well-known for affixing some of the
primary restrictions on surveillance technology. 115 While the ECPA
included three titles, 116 Title II and Title III of the Act are the most
relevant to the types of electronic communication discussed herein.
Title III of the ECPA contains provisions for the issuance of
Pen Registers and Trap/Trace devices and is otherwise known as the
“Pen/Trap Statute.” 117 Under the ECPA, a “pen register” is a tool that
records outgoing numbers dialed from the targeted device, while a
“trap/trace device” is a tool that captures incoming numbers from the
targeted device. 118 Authorization for the use of such devices requires
only two pieces of information: 1) the identity of the government agent
making the application, and 2) the government agent’s certification
that the information to be obtained is relevant to the pending criminal

112

Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20.
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20.
114 See Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20-34.
115 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap
and Trace Device and Authorizing Release of Subscriber Info. and/or Cell Site Info., 396 F.
Supp. 2d 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 752.
118 Id.
113
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case. 119 Once such certification is made, the reviewing judge is forced
to issue an ex parte order, even if there is doubt as to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the certification. 120
Based on this Act, the United States Department of Justice
issued a 2005 Electronic Surveillance Manual and took the position
that Pen/Trap orders “must be obtained by the government before it
can use its own device to capture [codes unique to] a cellular
telephone,” including location information. 121 However, that very
same manual also indicates that Pen/Trap devices do not include those
that “identify that telephone to the network” or “receive[s] radio
signals, emitted from a wireless cellular telephone.” 122 Given that cellsite simulators both identify telephones on a network and receive
signals emitted from other wireless cellular telephones, it is clear that
the Department of Justice purposefully excluded these devices from
the list of those that require even the minimal requirements of a
Pen/Trap Order. 123 While a subsequent 2013 Department of Justice
document indicated that a Pen/Trap Order is necessary when the
government is trying to obtain codes unique to a target phone, it failed
to address what type of court authorization, if any, is required to obtain
cellular location data. 124 Furthermore, even though the Pen/Trap
provision under this Act was amended in 2001 to include any device
that also captures “signaling information,” the type of court
authorization required for location information continues to be
unclear. 125

119

Id. at 753 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012)).
In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Auth. the Use of a Pen Register and a Trap
and Trace, 396 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
121 Linda Lye, Stingrays: The Most Common Surveillance Tool the Government Won’t Tell
You About, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL. 1, 5 (June 27, 2014),
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/StingRays_The_Most_Common_Surveillance_Too
l_the_Govt_Won%27t_Tell_You_About_0.pdf.
122 Id.
123 Id. (indicating that despite the fact that cell-site simulators are excluded from the
Pen/Trap Order requirements, court authorization is recommended “out of an abundance of
caution”).
124 Id.
125 Id.
120
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B. The Stored Communications Act
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v.
United States, 126 Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”), barring service providers from willingly disclosing customer
communication information to any outside source, including the
government, absent a qualifying exception. 127 If such information is
required, however, the SCA provides the necessary procedure that the
government must follow in order to obtain a telecommunication
customer’s information. 128
Despite the fact that the SCA frustrates the practices of many
federal agencies that rely on their unfettered ability to obtain electronic
communications, 129 the SCA is also drastically inconsistent and
provides little guidance as to what is required for authorized
disclosure:
For example, the SCA contained multiple provisions
allowing for the disclosure of the same stored
communications. Under subsection (c)(1)(A), the SCA
allows disclosure of communication information upon
the issuance of a warrant based on probable cause.
However, subsection (c)(1)(B) refers the reader to
subsection (d) of the same provision, which states that
a court “shall issue” an order directing a cell-service
provider to disclose electronic communications only if
the government “offers specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the … records or other information sought[] are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal
investigation.” The standard of proof of subsection
(c)(1)(A), probable cause, and that of subsection
(c)(1)(B), relevance to an ongoing criminal
investigation, are clearly different. 130
126

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Jeremy H. D’Amico, Note, Cellphones, Stingrays, and Searches! An Inquiry into the
Legality of Cellular Location Information, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1252, 1269, 1273 (2016);
Richard M. Thompson II & Jared P. Cole, Stored Communications Act: Reform of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 1, 3
(May 19, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf.
128 Thompson II & Cole, supra note 127.
129 Thompson II & Cole, supra note 127, at 1.
130 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1272.
127
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The SCA appears to allow courts to authorize obtainment of
cell-site data both by a necessary showing of probable cause, a
relatively high burden for the government to meet, while at the same
time authorizing the obtainment of cell-site data under a much lower
burden of proof of reasonable materiality to an ongoing
investigation. 131 As previously indicated by critics of the SCA: “Why
would law enforcement seek to satisfy the probable cause standard
under subsection (c)(1)(A) if it can obtain the same stored
communications under a relevance standard of subsection
(c)(1)(B)?” 132
The SCA also does not explicitly indicate whether cell-site data
is a “stored communication” that is even covered under the SCA. 133
For example, the SCA’s definition of “electronic communications”
fails to include that which comes from a “tracking device,” 134 seeming
to indicate that cell-site information could still be obtained regardless
of the SCA’s limitations. With the amorphous technology of cell-site
simulators, the SCA provides little restriction on the government’s use.
C. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
In October 1994, Congress passed the Communications
Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) in order to require
telecommunication carriers to obtain the technology and equipment
necessary to provide cellular data information to the government upon
its request. 135 The government enacted CALEA due to “concerns that
emerging technologies such as digital and wireless communications
were making it increasingly difficult for law enforcement agencies to
execute authorized surveillance.” 136 In 2006, Congress expanded the
reach of CALEA to include broadband Internet access providers in the
statute’s definition of “telecommunication carriers.” 137

131

D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1272-73.
D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1273.
133 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1273-74.
134 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1274.
135 Lye, supra note 121, at 6.
136 Introduction, Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION,
https://www.fcc.gov/public-safety-and-homelandsecurity/policy-and-licensing-division/general/communications-assistance#introduction (last
updated Feb. 9, 2017).
137 Id.
132
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While CALEA prohibits the government’s use of a Pen/Trap
Order when trying to obtain an individual’s location information, 138 the
Department of Justice’s 2005 Electronic Surveillance Manual has
indicated that the government can still use cell-site simulators and
other IMSI catchers to obtain location information. 139 This is mostly
due to a nuanced interpretation of CALEA, as it only applies to
“information collected by a provider and not information collected
directly by law enforcement authorities.” 140 Therefore, interpreting
when it is safe to use a cell-site simulator, in what capacity, and upon
what authorization remains unclear.
D. The 2001 U.S.A. Patriot Act
As technology rapidly advanced at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, the government’s need for easy access to a vast array of
electronic data also reached an all-time high. After the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted the Patriot Act, which was
characterized as a “‘sweeping antiterrorism law that gave the
government
vast
new
powers
to
conduct
electronic
141
surveillance. . . .” Though enacted to increase the government’s role
in the private lives of citizens for protection purposes, the Patriot Act
actually increased the privacy of many individuals when it came to
cell-site information 142—something that had yet to be definitively done
before.
Under the Patriot Act, the term “pen register” was expanded to
include any “device or process which records or decodes dialing,
routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an
instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication
is transmitted” 143 and it required definitive court authorization, by way
of a Pen/Trap Order, 144 before it could be obtained by the

138

Lye, supra note 121, at 6.
Lye, supra note 121, at 6.
140 Lye, supra note 121, at 6.
141 Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That
Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 607, 607 (2003).
142 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 26.
143 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 26 n.130.
144 As a reminder, a Pen/Trap Order requires only that the government agent making the
application identify himself or herself and certify that the information to be obtained is relevant
to a pending criminal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012).
139
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government. 145 Given that cell-site simulators work by obtaining
information from the signals emitted by a cellular device, the Patriot
Act suggested that the government’s use of cell-site simulators had to
be preceded by a Pen/Register Order authorized by the court. 146
Although the proof necessary to obtain a Pen/Register Order is not a
particularly difficult burden for the government to meet, 147 the Patriot
Act at least prevents the government from using cell-site simulation
technology without any authorization by the court, as was likely
previously allowable under the SCA and CALEA due to their
conflicting provisions.
E. The 2012 StingRay Magistrate Opinion
Despite the government’s long-term use of cell-site simulators,
it was not until 2012 that federal judges began to address the capacities
of cell-site simulators and their impact on individual’s Fourth
Amendment search and seizure rights. In 2012, a Texas federal
magistrate judge issued one of the first orders denying the use of a
StingRay machine, a portable device that would allow the government
to capture radio signals from the target’s cellular telephone, analyze
the target’s registration data, and use the collected information to
determine his location. 148 In this particular case, the DEA was
conducting a criminal investigation of the defendant, a suspected
narcotics trafficker. 149 Having knowledge that the defendant had been
using his cell phone to initiate trafficking operations, the DEA applied
to the court for authorization to install and use “a pen register trap and
trace device for a period of sixty (60) days to detect radio signals
emitted from wireless cellular telephones in the vicinity of the
[defendant]. . . .” 150 The DEA further notified the court that it intended
to obtain this information through the use of a StingRay machine. 151

145

Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 27.
Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 27.
147 See supra note 144.
148 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Installation and Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace Device, 890 F.
Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
149 Id. at 748.
150 Id.
151 Id.
146
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While the court noted that Pen/Register Orders had typically
been used to obtain cellular data, 152 it also indicated that the method
that the DEA proposed to use to obtain the data in this case would
virtually transform the defendant’s cellular phone into a government
tracking device. 153 As the burden of proof for a Pen/Register Order
would only require the identity of the government agent making the
application and his certification that the information to be obtained is
relevant to a pending criminal case, 154 the court determined that the
DEA’s use of a StingRay machine to track the defendant required a
higher burden of proof than a typical Pen/Trap Order. 155 Due to the
wide array of information that could be obtained with the StingRay
device, as well as the DEA’s lack of proof as to why the StingRay
machine would be sufficiently allowable for use under only a
Pen/Register Order, the court denied the DEA’s application for its
use. 156 The court was concerned that the DEA was unable to explain
the StingRay technology and how it could be limited to obtaining only
the defendant’s information. 157 Clearly, the high likelihood of
infringement, even inadvertently, on an individual’s constitutional
rights had finally become apparent.
F. The September 2015 U.S. Department of Justice Order
of Public Affairs re: Enhanced Policy for Use of CellSite Simulators
On September 3, 2015, the Department of Justice issued a
directive specifically related to the government’s use of cell-site
simulators during investigations, requiring “increased privacy
protections and higher legal standards.” 158 The directive promised to
152 Id. at 748-49; see also In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America
For an Order Authorizing the Use of a Two Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices, 632 F.
Supp. 2d 202, 211 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (granting the government’s application for the obtainment
of cell-site information because it was based on “specific and articulable facts showing
reasonable grounds to believe that the information sought is relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation”).
153 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
154 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012).
155 In the Matter of the Application of the United States of America, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 752.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 749.
158 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (Sep. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announcesenhanced-policy-use-cell-site-simulators (referring to The DOJ Cell-Site Simulator Policy,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sep. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download).
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increase accountability, “improve training and supervision,” and create
a more “consistent legal standard” for its use, 159 and was applicable to
federal law enforcement agencies administered by the Department of
Justice. 160
With this policy, the Department of Justice desired to protect
the privacy rights of individuals through careful auditing to ensure that
insufficient data obtained through the use of cell-site simulators was
appropriately deleted, including the content of text messages, emails,
contact lists and pictures.” 161 It also indicated that the new policy
clarified “that cell-site simulators may not be used to collect the
contents of any communication in the course of criminal
investigations.” 162 Despite the above, the Department of Justice still
recommended that government users of cell-site technology obtain a
search warrant supported by probable cause before attempting to use
the technology. 163 This unequivocal assertion suggests that even the
Department of Justice was aware of the potential infringement of
individual constitutional rights that could occur with the use of cellsite simulation devices. However, these recommendations concerning
the use of cell-site simulators have yet to be addressed by either the
Supreme Court or the New York Court of Appeals.
VI.

THE THIRD-PARTY DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
A. History

With the Supreme Court narrowing the Fourth Amendment’s
focus and protections on whether an individual has a “legitimate
expectation of privacy” in the activity in question, 164 the third-party
disclosure doctrine has been a significant obstacle in a proponent’s
argument that cell-site information falls into a constitutionally
protected category.
The most well-known case addressing the third-party
disclosure doctrine for search and seizure purposes is Lee v. United

159

Id.
Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158.
164 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
160
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States. 165 Here, the defendant was convicted for the sale of opium
based on incriminating statements that he unknowingly made to an
undercover agent working for the Bureau of Narcotics. 166 While the
defendant argued that evidence of his statements should be suppressed
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court nevertheless
affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that information given
with consent and made freely available to the public was not a violation
of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. 167
Later courts began broadening Lee’s holding to include not
only public conversations but also any combination of acts that were
purposefully made public. 168 These cases stood for the proposition that
“when a person reveals some information to a third party, they assume
the risk that the third party may disclose it to the Government.”169
Therefore, no individual could validly allege a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights in the government’s obtainment of any information
that he willingly made public.
However, the concept of assuming all risk during voluntary
relinquishment of information became, and remains, cloudier when
considering intangible information, such as cell-site data. Any cellphone user can recall signing a rather lengthy carrier contract when
initiating service, often filled with legal jargon and endless terms,
representations, and warranties; however, few, if any, can remember
the terms to which they signed. 170 Instead, one usually only recalls that
the provided terms must be agreed to before the carrier provides the

165

Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
Id. at 749.
167 Id. at 750-52 (indicating that the information obtained from the defendant was given
freely with his consent).
168 Browne, supra note 2, at 86 (indicating that voluntary relinquishment of an expectation
of privacy is exemplified in many daily activities made purposefully public, including
“numbers dialed on a telephone, deposit slips handed to a bank teller, information written on
the exterior of a package sent through the mail, statements made to undercover police officers,
personal documents handed over to government officials, trash left for pickup by municipal
employees, or academic papers turned over to professors”).
169 In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing
the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. Supp. 2d 113, 120 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742-46 (1979)).
170 United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 345 (4th Cir. 2015) (indicating that “studies have
shown that users of electronic communication services often do not read or understand their
providers’ privacy policies.”).
166
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user with service. 171 Few really ever consider what “providing the user
with service” truly means. 172 While it does mean that the user has
accessibility to his address book, his social calendar, and the
worldwide web at the push of a button, it also means that the user is
allowing the carrier to be the third-party receiver for all incoming and
outgoing cellular data. 173
Therefore, by using the cellular phone and agreeing to the
carrier’s terms, a user is voluntarily conveying his cellular information,
including location, to the carrier for processing. 174 As the agreement
to convey this information is usually done in a willing and purposeful
manner, does the cellular user now assume all risk that his information
and location may fall into the hands of the government? There has yet
to be clear judicial insight as to whether the third-party disclosure
doctrine would provide valid reasoning to infer than an individual’s
signing of a cellular phone contract causes him to voluntarily forfeit
his expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in instances
involving cell-site simulators.
B. The Third-Party Disclosure Doctrine and Cellular
Information as Interpreted by the Courts
The most notable case involving cellular information and the
third-party doctrine arose from the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith
v Maryland. 175 Here, after Patricia McDonough was robbed, she began
receiving threatening phone calls and visits from a man who claimed
to be the robber. 176 When the police ran the license plate provided by
McDonough after one of the visits, the police found out that the car
belonged to defendant, Michael Lee Smith. 177 Thereafter, the police
obtained a Pen/Register Order which allowed the telephone company

171

Liane Cassavoy, Before You Sign a Cell Phone Contract: What You Need to Know,
LIFEWIRE, https://www.lifewire.com/before-signing-cell-phone-contract-579606 (last updated
Oct. 17, 2016).
172 Id.
173 Browne, supra note 2, at 65-66.
174 In the Matter of an Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing
the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 121 (indicating that when
one turns his phone on and utilizes calling and texting features, he is “voluntarily” conveying
his cellular data to the third-party service carrier).
175 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
176 Id. at 737.
177 Id.
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to record the numbers dialed from the defendant’s home telephone.178
The Register eventually revealed that calls were placed from the
defendant’s phone to McDonough’s home. 179 Based on these findings,
the police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s home, where
they found a phone book flagged with McDonough’s number. 180 The
defendant was arrested, identified by McDonough, and indicted for
robbery. 181
The defendant submitted a pre-trial motion seeking to suppress
all evidence obtained from the Pen/Register Order, claiming that the
police’s failure to secure a probable cause warrant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. 182 The
trial court denied the defendant’s motion and the appellate court
affirmed the defendant’s conviction. 183 Thereafter, the Supreme Court
held that people had no “actual expectation of privacy” in the phone
numbers they dial since all users were forced to submit the numbers to
the telephone carrier in order for the calls to be completed. 184 Citing
United States v. Miller, 185 the Court determined that the defendant
“assumed the risk of disclosure” and therefore it was unreasonable for
him to expect the phone numbers that he dialed to remain private.186

178

Id.
Id.
180 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 737-38.
184 Id. at 735. The court further held that:
All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities
for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list
of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. In fact, pen
registers and similar devices are routinely used by telephone companies
“for the purposes of checking billing operations, detecting fraud and
preventing violations of law.” United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
U.S., at 174–175, 98 S.Ct., at 373. Electronic equipment is used not only
to keep billing records of toll calls, but also “to keep a record of all calls
dialed from a telephone which is subject to a special rate
structure.” Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254, 266
(CA9 1977) (concurring opinion).
Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
185 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
186 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (“This analysis dictates that petitioner can claim no legitimate
expectation of privacy here. When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed
numerical information to the telephone company and “exposed” that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the
company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that
179
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Though not specifically discussing location tracking, the Court’s
ruling expanded the concept of the third-party disclosure doctrine to
telephone devices. 187
In State v. Andrews, 188 the Court of Special Appeals in
Maryland was asked to decide whether a cell phone could be turned
into a “real-time tracking device by the government without a warrant”
in light of the State’s argument that the third-party doctrine prevented
the defendant from proclaiming a Fourth Amendment violation.189
Here, the Baltimore City Police Department picked up the defendant,
Kerron Andrews, through the warrantless use of a cell-site
simulator. 190 Specifically, the Baltimore City Police ascertained the
defendant’s location by using Hailstorm, a brand of cell-site simulator,
which tricked the defendant’s phone into providing signals that the
police used to narrow his location to a specific residence in Baltimore
City. 191 The Hailstorm was authorized for police use through the
obtainment of a Pen/Register-Trap/Trace Order, which allowed for
collection of GPS data from the defendant’s cellular device. 192 The
government obtained the defendant’s precise location with the
assistance of the defendant’s cellular carrier and through the
defendant’s use of the email application on his phone. 193
The Baltimore City Police Department obtained an arrest
warrant and went to the defendant’s residence, finding him on the
couch with the targeted cell phone in his pants pocket. 194 At trial, the
defendant argued that the Baltimore City Police Department’s use of
the cell-site simulator without a probable cause warrant constituted an
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, to
which the Circuit Court agreed and suppressed all evidence as “fruit of
the poisonous tree.” 195 The State appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, 196 which held that the use of the cell-site

processed those numbers is merely the modern counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier
day, personally completed calls for the subscriber.”).
187 Id. at 744-45.
188 State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350 (2016).
189 Id. at 354, 395.
190 Id. at 354.
191 Id. at 359.
192 Id. at 356-57.
193 Andrews, 227 Md. App. at 359.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 354.
196 Id. at 354-55.
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simulator did constitute an illegal search and seizure despite arguments
that the defendant chose to voluntarily provide his cellular data to the
public through the mere activation of his cellular phone. 197 The court
further identified the government’s use of cell-site simulation
technology as the beginning of an “age of no privacy.” 198
Despite the State’s argument that the cell-site simulator merely
obtained cellular data “regularly transmitted by activated cell phones
as part of their ordinary use,” 199 the court distinguished the cell-site
simulator from a typical cellular phone tower in that a StingRay device
tricks the cellular phones into transmitting data rather than just
collecting data already being transmitted. 200 Accordingly, the court
determined that cell phone users do not voluntarily convey this
information “simply by choosing to activate and use their cell phones
and to carry the devices on their person.” 201 Relying on Katz’s holding
that the Fourth Amendment applies to people and not places, the court
concluded that people do have a legitimate expectation in real-time cell
data, including location information. 202 As such, the court held that
the Baltimore City Police Department’s use of a cell-site simulator
without a valid search warrant based on probable cause was a violation
of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free from illegal
searches and seizures. 203
VII.

THE LAW AS IT STANDS TODAY: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AS APPLIED TO CELL-SITE SIMULATION DEVICES
A. United States v. Rigmaiden

In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit decided a case involving a cell-site simulator in United States
v. Rigmaiden. 204 Here, the government alleged that the defendant had
been using the identities of individuals (some deceased) to file
197

Id. at 392-93.
Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350 at 371-72.
199 Id. at 377-78.
200 Id. at 379.
201 Id. at 392 (indicating that cellular phone users do not actively submit their location
information to their service provider).
202 Id. at 355.
203 Andrews, 227 Md. App. at 355-56.
204 United States v. Rigmaiden, No. CR 08-814-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1932800 (D. Ariz.
May 8, 2013).
198
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fraudulent tax returns through the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
website, enabling him to claim more than $3,000,000 in tax refunds.205
In moving to suppress evidence against him, the defendant claimed
that the process used by the IRS in obtaining his identification and
location violated his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable
search and seizure. 206
Specifically, in 2007, the IRS subpoenaed subscriber
information for the internet addresses that the defendant used to file
the allegedly fraudulent returns, discovering that the address was
associated with a Verizon wireless Internet card owned by someone
named Travis Rupard. 207 In 2008, the IRS Fraud Detention Center
identified a large number of potentially fraudulent tax filings that
required refunds to be sent to different debit cards all associated with
the same bank account. 208 After doing further research, the IRS Fraud
Detention Center found that the accounts were maintained by the same
Travis Rupard, though it suspected that this was a false identity as the
address and driver’s license number associated with the account
belonged to a female by a different name. 209
The IRS pursued further investigations of this individual,
eventually coming across an e-mail exchange between Rupard and a
co-conspirator wherein Rupard had requested that the co-conspirator
establish a bank account for his fraudulent tax filings. 210 The
government also obtained transaction logs from Verizon in connection
with the use of the defendant’s wireless Internet card. 211 Combining
this information with the email correspondence, the IRS was able to
identify that the defendant, using the alias “Travis Rupard,” was the
actual owner of the wireless card. 212 The IRS was thus able to
synthesize these facts to determine that the location of the wireless card
would lead them right to the defendant. 213 The police obtained cellsite records from the network carrier connected with the Internet card,
Verizon Wireless, and discovered that the Internet card was being used

205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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regularly between the same towers around Santa Clara, California. 214
Wanting the defendant’s location, the police manipulated cell towers
until they were able to determine a point within an area of just onequarter mile of his location. 215
Thereafter, the police obtained an order from the court that
authorized the installation of a cell-site tracking device via a
Pen/Register and Trap/Trace Order. 216 Upon further use of this device,
the police tracked the use of the Internet card directly to the specific
apartment where the defendant lived. 217 The police then verified that
the apartment belonged to the defendant and obtained a search warrant
of the apartment, leading to the defendant’s arrest. 218 The defendant
was indicted on 74 counts of mail and wire fraud, after which he made
a motion to suppress any information obtained by the police through
the use of the cell-site simulator, arguing that the collected information
was outside the scope of the warrant obtained by the police. 219
The Ninth Circuit ultimately found that the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in either the Internet card, his
laptop, or his apartment. 220 As the defendant had obtained the Internet
card and laptop fraudulently and used the Internet card and laptop
solely for fraudulent purposes, the Ninth Circuit held that the
defendant could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such
use. 221 Although the defendant may have had a “thoroughly justified
subjective expectation of privacy” in his use of the equipment, the
court determined that it was “not one which the law recognizes as
legitimate.” 222 Further, the court determined that the defendant’s
presence in the apartment was also wrongful because it was
fraudulently registered under the name of a deceased individual. 223
Therefore, the court determined that the defendant also had no
legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment. 224
214

Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *3.
Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *1.
220 Id. at *5.
221 Id.
222 Id. at *6 (relying on Rakas v. Illinois, 429 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)).
223 Id.
224 Rigmaiden, 2013 WL 1932800 at *6 (“One who so thoroughly immerses himself in
layers of false identities should not later be heard to argue that society must recognize as
legitimate his expectation of privacy in the location and implements of his fraud.”).
215
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit held that given the “totality of the
unique circumstances,” the defendant lacked an “objectively
reasonable expectation of privacy” and that “[a]s a result, no Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when the government searched for and
located the [Internet card] in his apartment.” 225 Nonetheless, since the
defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in this case, the
court never addressed whether the cell-site simulation device was
properly used and authorized.
In 2016, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York decided a similar issue in United States v.
Lambis. 226 Here, the DEA was authorized, under a Pen/Register
warrant, to obtain cell-site data to determine the defendant’s location
on suspicion that he was part of an international drug-trafficking
scheme. 227 Through the use of pen register technology, the DEA was
able to narrow the defendant’s location to “the Washington Heights
area by 177th and Broadway” but was unable to identify an apartment
building or apartment number. 228 Therefore, the DEA arranged for an
agent to physically carry a portable StingRay device, which simulated
nearby cell towers and forced surrounding cellular phones to transmit
location information, around the identified Washington Heights
area. 229 By using the StingRay machine, the agent was able to identify
the apartment building where the defendant was located, and was
further able to locate the defendant’s specific apartment number after
walking up and down the halls with the device until he found the
location where “the signal was strongest.” 230
After identifying that the apartment belonged to the defendant,
the DEA obtained consent to search the defendant’s bedroom and
recovered evidence that led to his arrest. 231 The defendant moved to
suppress all evidence found in his apartment on the basis, similar to
the holding in Kyllo v. United States, 232 that the use of the cell-site
simulator constituted an unreasonable search of the interior of his
225

Id. at *9.
United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
227 Id. at 608.
228 Id. at 609.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Lambis, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
232 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that it was a Fourth Amendment
violation to reveal “details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion”).
226
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home and surveilled activities that were not purposefully made
public. 233 Contrarily, the government argued that its use of the
StingRay machine was authorized under the original Pen/Register
warrant and therefore did not constitute a violation of the defendant’s
constitutional rights. 234
The Southern District of New York ultimately held that the use
of the StingRay technology to determine the defendant’s precise
location was not contemplated in the approval of the original warrant
application and was therefore outside of its scope. 235 Even though the
government argued that it had sufficient probable cause at the time that
the StingRay machine was used, the court determined that the
government’s belief was not sufficient because it was required under
the Fourth Amendment to obtain such a warrant from a magistrate
prior to conducting the search, not after. 236 The court supported its
determination with evidence that internal policies issued by the
Department of Justice required the government to obtain a valid search
warrant prior to the use of cell-site simulation technology. 237 Given
the court’s emphasis on the inherent intrusiveness of the StingRay
devices, 238 as well as the indication that the minimal requirements
needed to establish a Pen/Register warrant were insufficient in this
case, 239 Lambis suggests that probable cause must be established in
order to authorize use of these highly-intrusive cell-site simulation
devices. 240
VIII. ANALYSIS: PROBABLE CAUSE IS THE APPROPRIATE
STANDARD FOR THE USE OF CELL-SITE SIMULATION
TECHNOLOGY
With no definitive consensus as to whether the government’s
use of StingRay machines and other types of cell-site simulators
violates an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures without a probable cause warrant,
233

Lambis, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
Id. at 611.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 The court finds a cell-site simulation search to be much more “intrusive than a canine
sniff,” for example. Lambis, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 610.
239 Id. at 611.
240 Id.
234
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the current state of the law has allowed the government to use these
highly-intrusive devices with minimal boundaries. 241 However, given
that the courts have previously expressed concern over a privacy-less
society, 242 and the fact that individuals have an expectation and belief
that the government is not going to track their location and cellular
data without their consent, 243 it is likely that the Supreme Court would
hold that the government is not authorized to utilize these highly
invasive and machines without a showing of probable cause.
The Department of Justice has already recommended that the
use of cell-site technology, including cell-site simulators, be
authorized only with sufficient probable cause. 244 As discussed supra
in Section V, the Department of Justice, concerned by the Fourth
Amendment implications of cell-site simulators, 245 has stated that the
government’s application for the use of a cell-site simulator should
include the specifics of the technology to be used, the possibility that
the retrieval of information from a target phone could disrupt other
cellular devices in the area, and how that specific government agency
plans to ensure that the data collected will no longer be accessible
during future uses of the technology. 246 As such, the proverbial red
flag has clearly been waived. For the Department of Justice to issue a
department-wide policy concerning the use of cell-site simulation
technology, its reservations concerning the potential constitutional
infringement that such technology can cause must be relatively
strong. 247 Following suit, the Supreme Court is also likely to see how
threatening this technology can be to the Fourth Amendment
protections.

241 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 35 (indicating that there is a “dearth of judicial
analysis” on the topic of cell-site simulators and the collection of cell-site data by the
government despite the use of “cellular surveillance devices for more than twenty years”).
242 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
243 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1279-80.
244 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158.
245 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158.
246 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158.
247 See United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (indicating that
the Department of Justice’s enhanced policy was based on its own recognition that it “may not
turn a citizen’s cell phone into a tracking device”).
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Since StingRay machines and other cell-site simulators have a
unique ability and inadvertent likelihood that they will penetrate the
area at the very core of the Fourth Amendment, the four walls of the
home, common law precedent requires that a probable cause warrant
be issued prior to its use. 248 For example, in Andrews, the police, after
tracing the defendant’s phone, found the defendant sitting on his couch
with his cellular phone in his pocket. 249 Clearly, the use of the
StingRay machine in that case penetrated the interior of the home and
should, according to Kyllo, automatically constitute an unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment. 250 However, even when cell-site
simulators do not track an individual’s precise location to an area
within the four walls of his home, the Court in Jones has suggested that
the use of cell-site simulators without a sufficient probable cause
warrant can still classify as an unreasonable intrusion into the private
life of an individual because lengthy surveillance monitoring can
provide intimate details about a person’s “familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations . . . .” 251
One of the most important functions of the cell-site simulator
is also its biggest problem. Cell-site simulators obtain not only
location and registration information from the targeted cellular phone
user, but also incidental information from third-party devices using the
same cell network and towers. 252 Even the Department of Justice
acknowledged this flaw as recently as 2015, when it promised to audit
the type and amount of information collected when utilizing cell-site

248

See generally In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of StingRays, supra note

16.
249

State v. Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350, 359 (2016).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that obtaining “details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion” constitutes a
search under the Fourth Amendment that requires a probable cause warrant).
251 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see
also People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009) (indicating that location monitoring
could reveals acts of “indisputably private nature” such as “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDs treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense
attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, [and]
the gay bar”).
252 Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New York, N.Y. CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION
5
(Aug.
2015),
https://www.nyclu.org/sites/default/files/memo_stingrayuse_NY_201508_final.pdf
(indicating that reports show that even when personal information is not obtained from
unintended users through the use of a cell-site simulator, use of the machine can still interfere
with others’ cell phone service, downgrading their service connectivity from 3G or 4G to 2G).
250
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simulators department-wide. 253 However, while promises may be
made, there is no actual way to prevent the collection of this extraneous
data, considering that the cell-site simulators force the targeted phone
and surrounding phones to disclose such information. 254 The mere fact
that such an overbreadth of information can be received and reviewed
by the government without the knowledge of the cellular user is
certainly an infringement on that individual’s constitutional rights
because few, if any, individuals actively submit this information for
public use. 255 Therefore, to allow such information to be obtained
without at least a demonstration of probable cause would be
unconstitutional because it would not adequately safeguard an
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. 256
With regard to how the third-party doctrine applies to the use
of cell-site simulators, Andrews and Lambis provide the most logical
explanations. Cell-site simulators do not simply intercept data being
conveyed through a cellular device to a corresponding carrier’s cell
tower; instead, they force the phone to send communications that it
may not otherwise emit for the sole purpose of intercepting those
communications, interpreting the data, and pinpointing the exact
location of the user. 257 Though many individuals today understand that
their cellular data can be incidentally intercepted by virtue of the
unique way in which cellular devices function, they most certainly do
not have an expectation that the government may hack their phones to
determine their almost precise location. 258 Generally, third-party
carriers are able to provide some “push-back” to any government
253 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158.
254 Browne, supra note 2, at 86 (indicating that “[n]o affirmative action is required for cell
phone users to convey their CSLI to a cell phone service provider”).
255 United States v. Lambis, 197 F. Supp. 3d 606, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (indicating that cellsite data being transmitted to cell-site simulators has a “layer of involuntariness” as they are
“not transmitted in the normal course of the phone’s operation” but are forced by the cell-site
technology to “transmit their unique identifying electronic serial numbers”); Browne, supra
note 2, at 86.
256 Browne, supra note 2, at 71-72 (“Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been
withdrawn from public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in the
home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight.”). Interestingly, this
source has failed to identify what “withdrawing from public view” entails and whether or not
an affirmative act is required for “withdrawal” from public view to take place.
257 Proposed Brief Amicus Curiae, supra note 65, at 8, 10.
258 Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New York, supra note
252, at 2 (indicating that cell phone owners do not ever believe that their phone is “connecting
with . . . a law enforcement device”).
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attempts at invalid intrusions; however, given that Stingrays and other
cell-site devices are able to bypass third-party authorizations and still
obtain location information without leaving behind any virtual
footprints, 259 it can be argued that this is not a right that anyone could
unequivocally forfeit absent knowledge about basic cell-site simulator
functionality.
Furthermore, as cell-site simulators respond to the basic
functionality of cellular devices in obtaining their information, 260 the
individual never affirmatively acts to convey the information to the
carrier. 261 This contrasts greatly with the cases in which the courts
have determined the third-party disclosure doctrine to be a bar against
privacy expectations in information purposefully made public.262
Unless the potential risks of government interference are clearly
explained to an individual prior to his or her agreement to use a cellular
device, it is unclear whether that individual voluntarily and knowingly
waived his right to privacy under the third-party disclosure doctrine. 263
Understanding such, it is clear that individuals do have an expectation
of privacy in their cellular location, and since the Constitution
prohibits such unreasonable and intrusive searches under the Fourth
Amendment, the most likely outcome is that the Supreme Court will
require that probable cause be established before the government can
utilize a cell-site simulator. Given that probable cause requires at least
a fair probability that a search will be successful in obtaining the

259

Pell & Soghoian, supra note 21, at 147.
As documented supra, cell-site simulators obtain their information from the registration
processes performed by cellular devices every seven seconds. Electronic Surveillance
Manual, supra note 36, at 178-79 n.41.
261 Browne, supra note 2, at 86.
262 See Browne, supra note 2, at 86 (indicating that voluntary relinquishment of an
expectation of privacy was exemplified in many daily activities made purposefully public,
including “numbers dialed on a telephone, deposit slips handed to a bank teller, information
written on the exterior of a package sent through the mail, statements made to undercover
police officers, personal documents handed over to government officials, trash left for pickup
by municipal employees, or academic papers turned over to professors”).
263 Browne, supra note 2, at 86-87 (“Oblique mention in a statement of terms and conditions
or user agreement for cell phone service that the service provider might share certain
information with the government when required to do so does not change this result. Every
rational presumption is indulged against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; unless a
cell phone user receives a clear, explicit, and conspicuous explanation that use of their phone
result in their location and movements being warrantlessly monitored, he should not be
presumed to waive his Fourth Amendment rights when his cell phone is turned on. Warnings
of similar prominence have been required in agreements that purport to waive other
constitutional and contractual rights.”).
260
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information that it seeks, 264 rather than a finding that the search is
merely relevant to the investigation, 265 the probable cause standard
provides the greatest guarantee of protection for individuals that the
Fourth Amendment sought to preserve.
While the government may put forth arguments of the
invaluable services that cell-site simulators provide, including
assistance in locating wanted, and often quite dangerous, criminals, 266
it should be noted that the need for a higher quantum of proof for the
authorization of cell-site simulators does not seek to demote the
invaluable assistance that these devices could provide if properly
authorized. Cell-site simulators can still provide instrumental
information to federal agencies and local police departments to assist
in their obtainment of justice; however, the ability to use this highly
technical equipment should not be based on the mere certification of a
government agent that the information to be obtained is relevant. 267
Instead, the sheer invasiveness of cell-site simulation technology into
the private lives of its subjects should require an establishment of
sufficient probable cause for its use. 268 Moreover, while some
agencies, such as the Securities Exchange Commission, may rely on
the minimum burden of proof that they need to demonstrate in order to
obtain cellular and other electronic data, 269 the fact “that this is the way
it had always been done” is simply not a justifiable argument when it
comes to the infringement of an individual’s constitutional rights.
Moreover, while some agencies may fear that a required
showing of probable cause prior to the use of cell-site simulation
technology can obstruct justice, 270 this requirement is not exempt from

264 U.S. v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238
(1983)).
265 See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012) (listing the criteria for application of a Pen/Register
Order).
266 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a
Certain Cellular Telephone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
267 See 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012) (listing the criteria for application of a Pen/Register
Order).
268 Browne, supra note 2, at 84-85.
269 Thompson II & Cole, supra note 127, at 1.
270 StingRay technology has been described by federal officials as the way it “track[s]
dangerous criminals . . . find[s] killers . . . find[s] kidnappers . . . find[s] drug dealers . . . [and]
find[s] missing children . . . .” Brad Heath, Police Secretly Track Cellphones to Solve Routine
TODAY
(Aug.
23,
2015),
Crimes,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/08/23/baltimore-police-stingray-cellsurveillance/31994181/.
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certain exigencies which demand prompt attention. 271 This would not
only account for the many critical situations in which time is of the
essence for criminal investigations but would also allow the
government to utilize this high-grade technology for assistance in
obtaining necessary information during state-wide or country-wide
emergencies. The waiver of the probable cause requirement in exigent
circumstances could diminish the government’s fear of an overall lack
of control but also contemporaneously help individuals maintain their
civil liberties guaranteed under the Constitution.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Since its creation, the Fourth Amendment has protected an
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. 272 This
protection was initially based on common-law principles of trespass,
as determined in Olmstead v. United States, which required actual
physical intrusion on private property before standing for a valid
Fourth Amendment violation was found. 273 In these situations, private
property was inherently determined to be an area in which one
reasonably expected his activities to remain private. 274 However, with
the emergence of new technology, the Supreme Court was forced to
address many situations in which an individual’s Fourth Amendment
rights could be implicated without the occurrence of physical
trespass. 275 This caused the Court to shift its reliance from places to
people when determining Fourth Amendment claims. 276 The Court has
since broadened Fourth Amendment protections in all situations where
there exists a reasonable expectation of privacy. 277
Yet, with the development of advanced surveillance
technology, individuals’ specific expectations of privacy have been

271 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (indicating that there are a
“few specifically established and well delineated exceptions” to the probable cause
requirement that would justify the government’s failure to obtain the probable cause warrant
before conducting a search).
272 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
273 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
274 Id. at 474-75.
275 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
276 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
277 See generally Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51, 359.
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further called into question. 278 While the Court had previously found
that no expectation of privacy could possibly exist in situations where
individuals made seemingly private details public, 279 the creation of
cell-site simulation technology currently used by the United States
government, military agencies, and intelligence agencies 280 has turned
previously private information inadvertently into public knowledge. 281
This is of particular importance when it comes to cellular telephones
and similar electronic devices for the reasons discussed in this Note.
Cellular telephones function through the outward emission of
These waves are automatically
radio transmission waves. 282
transmitted by the electronic device, regardless of the user’s
knowledge and intent, as long as the cellular device remains turned
on. 283 While this technology allows the user to quickly and easily
make and receive telephone calls, this process also makes these radio
transmissions highly susceptible to third-party interference. 284 Though
this interference is generally harmless, typically coming from outside
carriers that assist in providing a strong signal to the cellular user,285
data emitted by the cellular telephone is also subject to collection by
the government through the use of a cell-site simulator. 286 Like cell
towers, these simulators accept incoming radio transmissions;
however, they do so only by tricking nearby cellular devices into
thinking that they are cellular towers. 287 Contrary to regular cell
towers, these cell-site simulators are portable, box-shaped devices that
the government often uses to obtain a target’s precise identification
information. 288 Even if an individual is not the target of the
278 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33-34 (wherein the Court determined that technology clearly affected
the application of the Fourth Amendment and a vital question within this context concerned
“what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy”).
279 See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 35 (1988); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984).
280 Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them?, supra note 69.
281 Kerr, supra note 110, at 580 (indicating that “new technologies can bring “ ‘intimate
occurrences of the home out in the open’ “).
282 Browne, supra note 2, at 61-62.
283 Browne, supra note 2, at 62.
284 This is based on the concept that relay signals from cell phones effectively bounce back
and forth between a network of cell towers until they reach their intended destination. Browne,
supra note 2, at 62.
285 Browne, supra note 2, at 62.
286 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 16-17.
287 Owsley, supra note 19, at 192.
288 Gallagher, supra note 51.
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government’s investigation, that individual’s cellular location may still
be collected if he or she is within range of the cell-site simulator. 289
Despite the obvious privacy concerns that come with the
functionality of cell-site simulators, the government’s use of these
devices has managed to evade court discretion for years. 290 While
there have been some attempts to control the government’s use of
surveillance technology of this type, the lack of knowledge concerning
the capabilities of these devices has led to inconsistent and virtually
unhelpful attempts at regulation. 291 For example, the enactment of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Stored
Communications Act has only led to further confusion over what type
of information, if any, the government should supply to the courts for
authorization of the use of cell-site simulation technology. While the
very provisions of these acts are inconsistent, they have been
interpreted to only require certification by a government agent that the
information to be obtained is relevant to a criminal investigation,292
consistent with the requirements of a Pen/Register Order. 293 However,
this rather low burden of proof fails to account for the significant
impact this technology has on an individual’s reasonable expectation
of privacy.
The invasiveness of surveillance technology has been welldocumented by the court in Jones, where it was found that real-time
tracking of individuals inevitably leads to the publication of private
details about their personal lives which may not have ever been meant
to be made public. 294 Accordingly, there is a need for a higher burden
of proof before such devices can be utilized by the government in order
to protect the private lives of citizens. A probable cause requirement,
to be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate, prior to the
government’s use of cell-site simulators is warranted for the following
reasons: (1) the inherently intrusive nature of the cell-site simulator
devices; 295 (2) the overbreadth of information that can be inadvertently
collected by StingRay machines and other cell-site simulators; 296 (3)
289 Owsley, supra note 19, at 185-86 (indicating that these devices obtain data from all
cellular users who happen to be in the area, regardless of the government’s intention).
290 Browne, supra note 2, at 57.
291 Pell & Soghoian, supra note 19, at 20.
292 D’Amico, supra note 127, at 1272-73; Lye, supra note 121, at 5.
293 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b) (2012).
294 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-16 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
295 Id.
296 Owsley, supra note 19, at 185-86.
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the lack of guarantee that such information will be properly discarded
after their use; 297 (4) the cellular user’s lack of knowledge that such
information is being transmitted and collected; 298 and (5) the inability
of the user to know whether cell-site simulation technology will be
used to track an individual’s location within the most protected area
under the Fourth Amendment—the four walls of the home. 299 The
need for a well-established probable cause burden prior to the use of
cell-simulation technology is supported by the Department of Justice’s
own internal policy enhancements, 300 and is the only way to ensure a
minimum level of protection of individual privacy rights that the
Fourth Amendment serves to guarantee.

297

Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158 (indicating the Department of Justice’s own concern that data handling and
destruction were a concern with the use of cell-site simulators).
298 See Browne, supra note 2, at 86-87 (contrasting the transmission of cell-site data from a
cellular telephone to a cell-site simulator with the affirmative action required to purposefully
make information available to the public, such as with “information written on the exterior of
a package sent through the mail” or “statements made to undercover police officers”).
299 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).
300 Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site Simulators, supra
note 158.
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